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Labor and Employment

by W. Christopher Arbery*
and Valerie N. Njiiri**
The trial and appellate courts within the Eleventh Circuit handed
down a number of important opinions affecting labor and employment
law during the survey period of January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009.1
These included a ruling on a question of first impression in the Eleventh
Circuit regarding whether harassment claims are cognizable under the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994
(USERRA) 2 and notable decisions involving the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)3 and the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).4
I.

UNIFORMED SERVICES EMPLOYMENT AND
REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS ACT

Dees v. Hyundai Motor ManufacturingAlabama, LLC
In Dees v. Hyundai Motor ManufacturingAlabama, LLC,5 the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, on a motion for

A.

* Partner in the firm of Hall, Arbery & Gilligan LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Harvard
University (A.B., cum laude, 1988); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1994). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate on the Labor and Employment Team in the firm of Hunton & Williams
LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S., cum laude, 2001); Mercer University,
Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2005). Member, Mercer Law Review (2003-2005);
Managing Editor (2004-2005). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit labor and employment law during the prior survey
period, see W. Christopher Arbery, Valerie N. Njiiri & Leslie Eanes, Labor and
Employment, 2008 Eleventh Circuit Survey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1281 (2009).
2. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334 (2006).
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
5. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1220 (M.D. Ala. 2009), affd, No. 09-12107, 2010 WL 675714 (11th
Cir. Feb. 26, 2010).
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reconsideration, held that the defendants, Hyundai Motor Manufacturing
Alabama, LLC (HMMA) and Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (HMA), were
entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims under USERRA
because the plaintiff lacked standing to assert a claim for harassment
and did not have sufficient evidence to support his claim for termination.7 Most significantly, however, the court addressed a question of
first impression in the Eleventh Circuit when it ruled that claims for
harassment are valid under USERRA.8
The plaintiff, Jerry Leon Dees Jr., began working for HMMA in
November 2005 as a maintenance technician in the Stamping Maintenance Department. Dees was a staff sergeant and combat MP in the
Alabama National Guard during this time and previously served two
tours in Iraq. Dees alleged that his supervisors, Greg Prater and Kevin
Hughes, started harassing him when they learned of his military
service. 9

Prater allegedly required Dees to provide military orders for his
monthly Guard weekend training, forbade Dees from missing work to
attend Guard training, made derogatory comments about the Guard in
the presence of Dees and others, and attempted to convince Dees's
coworkers to make false statements that Dees violated company policies
and procedures. Dees also alleged that Prater and Hughes assigned him
more frequently to difficult and dangerous work compared to other
employees. Dees had the sergeant of his Guard unit submit a letter to
HMMA's Human Resources Department explaining that military orders
were not required for the Guard's monthly weekend training procedures
in the hopes that this would quell the harassment by Prater and
Hughes. The sergeant also offered to confirm Dees's presence at his
Guard unit's weekend training. Dees asserted that the sergeant's letter
did not quell the harassment and that, instead, the harassment
escalated.'

°

In February 2007 a production stamping manager for HMMA allegedly
accused Dees of sleeping on the job. Based on this incident, an HMMA
committee decided to terminate Dees's employment. Dees filed a lawsuit
against the defendants for allegedly terminating his employment because
of his Guard membership, for creating an environment of harassment in
violation of USERRA, and for claims of outrage and conversion under
state law. In May 2008 the district court granted the defendants' motion

6.
7.
8.
9.

10.

38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4334 (2006).
Dees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1225-26, 1229.
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1223.

Id.
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for summary judgment on Dees's USERRA termination claim, outrage
claim, and all claims against HMA, but not on Dees's USERRA
harassment and conversion claims against HMMA. Dees and HMMA
filed motions for reconsideration. 1
USERRA prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee
who serves in a "uniformed service" in the terms and conditions of
employment because of the employee's service. 2 The district court
determined that before it could reach the merits of Dees's USERRA
claims, it first had to examine whether HMMA and HMA were
employers under USERRA or whether only HMMA was Dees's employer. 13 USERRA defines an employer as "any person, institution,
organization, or other entity that pays salary or wages for work
performed or that has control over employment opportunities, including
... a person, institution, organization, or other entity to whom the
employer has delegated the performance of employment-related
responsibilities." 4 The district court believed that USERRAs focus is
on the individual or entity that carries out "employment-related
responsibilities" and not on the entity or individual that controls the
overall enterprise.15
The district court noted that HMMA was the manufacturer of Hyundai
vehicles in the United States, and HMA was the distributor, marketer,
and seller of these vehicles in the United States. Hyundai Motor6
Company (HMC) was the parent company for both HMA and HMMA.'
The court found that HMMA was the only entity that carried out
employment-related responsibilities because there were no HMA
employees working in Alabama, any Korean expatriate individuals on
loan from HMC to HMMA were employed by HMC, and the committee
members that made the decision regarding Dees's separation were all
HMMA employees. 7 Moreover, all the personnel decisions regarding
Dees's employment-his hiring, training, and separation-were
undertaken by HMMA's Human Resources Department without any
involvement by HMA.'8 While the court believed HMA and HMMA
definitely were linked companies, the court determined this was
insufficient to consider HMA an employer under USERRA because it did

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1222-23.
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).
Dees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1223.
38 U.S.C. § 4303(4)(A).
Dees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1224.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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not handle any employment-related duties. 9 Accordingly, the district
court found that HMA was entitled to summary judgment on all of
Dees's USERRA claims because it was not his employer.2"
As for Dees's USERRA claims against HMMA, the district court noted
that an employer discriminates against an employee in violation of
USERRA "if the employee's membership in the armed services 'is a
motivating factor in the employer's action, unless the employer can prove
that the action would have been taken in the absence of such membership.'" 2 ' The court found that discriminatory animus could be inferred
from Prater's actions and remarks; however, this discrimination could
not be imputed to HMMA because Prater had no role in Dees's
termination.22 The court opined that "[dliscriminatory remark[s] by [a]
non-decisionmaker [are] insufficient to satisfy a plaintiff's burden under
USERRA to show [an] employer's discriminatory motive."23
While Dees alleged that a supervisor who harassed him because of his
Guard membership also recommended his termination and attended the
termination committee meeting, the court determined that Dees failed
to provide any evidence that his protected status actually played a part
in the termination decision.24 The court found that HMMA considered
intentional sleeping on the job a terminable offense.25 The supervisor
that discovered Dees sleeping on the job believed it was intentional
because Dees was found sleeping in an isolated area that appeared set
up to avoid detection.26 The supervisor reported Dees's misconduct;
however, a committee ultimately made the decision to terminate Dees's
The court
employment based solely on the supervisor's allegations.2
found that Dees did not present any evidence that either the supervisor
or the committee harbored any bias towards those who served in the
In addition, even assuming that there was any truth to
military.2
Dees's contentions that the supervisor fabricated the allegations against
him, the court determined that Dees did not present any evidence that
the committee was not acting in good faith.29 Moreover, on the slim
chance that Dees could show that his military status was a motivating

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1224-25 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1)).
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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factor in the committee's decision to terminate his employment, the
district court held that the committee would have made the same
decision without regard to Dees's military service because it considered
intentionally sleeping on the job a terminable offense.3" Accordingly,
the court concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiff's USERRA termination claim.3 1
The district court observed that courts have not yet resolved whether
a harassment claim is valid under USERRA, nor had the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed this question.32
However, in reliance on a decision from a federal agency,33 the district
court determined that a claim for harassment because of an individual's
military service is a valid claim under USERRA. 34 The court opined
that other federal anti-discrimination statutes recognize harassment
claims.35 In addition, because the legislature intended USERRA to be
construed broadly for the benefit of returning veterans, it would be
consistent with that mandate to extend USERRA's protections to claims
for harassment.3 6 The court believed that one purpose of USERRA was
to encourage military service by assuring individuals that their jobs
would not be at risk if they chose to join the military.37 The court
determined that "[a]n assurance that employees cannot be fired on
account of their military service is meaningless without assurance that
the work environment will not be so intolerable that they will feel forced
to quit."38 The court believed this protection was especially necessary
in the current environment because almost half of the individuals in the
active military are non-career service members of the National Guard
and Reserves.3" Accordingly, the court held that Dees's USERRA
harassment claim was valid. °
The court next examined Dees's harassment claim using the severe
and pervasive standard established by the United States Supreme Court
to analyze Title VII 4 harassment claims.42 The district court found

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 1225-26.
Id. at 1226.
Id.
See Petersen v. Dep't of Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227 (1996).
Dees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1227-28.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1227.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
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that the following conduct Dees alleged met the standard for severe or
pervasive: Prater's frequent derogatory comments about his Guard
service, Prater's insistence that Dees produce military orders for every
Guard training weekend, Prater's insistence that Dees put his job with
HMMA above his military service, and Prater's frequently assigning
Dees to work that was more dangerous. 3 While the court believed this
evidence could preclude summary judgment for the defendants, it
nevertheless granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment
4
based on Dees's lack of standing on his USERRA harassment claim.
The court noted that it could only provide three kinds of relief for
USERRA violations: (1) it could require an employer to comply with
USERRA (including injunctive relief); (2) it could compensate an
individual for loss of wages or benefits suffered because the employer
failed to comply with USERRA; and (3) if it believed the employer
engaged in a willful violation of USERRA, it could award liquidated
damages in the amount of the lost wages or benefits the individual
suffered. 5 USERRA does not provide any recovery for mental anguish,
pain and suffering, or punitive damages.46 The court noted that Dees
did not suffer any loss of wages or benefits due to the alleged harassment by Prater, and thus, he would not be entitled to any recovery for
lost wages or benefits or any liquidated damages were he to prevail on
his harassment claim." In addition, because Dees no longer worked for
HMMA or HMA, injunctive relief requiring HMMA and HMA to comply
with USERRA would provide him with no benefit.48 The court concluded that there was no relief it could give Dees for the harassment he
allegedly endured. 9
Based on this conclusion, the court found that Dees did not have any
standing to assert his USERRA harassment claim." The requirements
for standing are:
(1) the plaintiff must have suffered ...

an invasion of a legally

protected interest resulting in a concrete and particularized injury, (2)
the injury must have been caused by the defendant's complained-of

42. Dees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67
(1986)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1228-29.
45. Id. at 1229.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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actions, and (3) the plaintiff's injury or threat of injury must likely be
redressible by a favorable court decision."
The court determined that Dees could not meet the third factor because
he could not obtain any relief from a decision in his favor.52 Accordingly, the court had no choice but to award the defendants summary
judgment on Dees's USERRA harassment claim.53
The court in Dees ruled on an issue of first impression in the Eleventh
Circuit. In addition to the claims of discrimination and retaliation under
USERRA, employers now will have to contend with claims for harassment under USERRA. It will be interesting to see whether the Eleventh
Circuit and other courts will follow the Middle District of Alabama's
decision, especially in what likely will be a climate of increased claims
under USERRA due to the large population of non-career active military
service members."F
B.

Atteberry v. Avantair, Inc.

In Atteberry v. Avantair, Inc.," the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida denied an employer's motion for summary
judgment after finding that the employer failed to meet its burden of
showing that it had legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for retracting
an offer of employment to an individual with military obligations.56
The plaintiff, Alex Atteberry, worked as a Flight Dispatcher for the
defendant, Avantair, Inc., from November 2005 through October 2006.
On or about November 25, 2007, Atteberry contacted Phil Torsello,
Avantair's director of operation's control center, to inquire about
potential reemployment. Atteberry alleged that Avantair made him a
job offer in the middle of December to begin reemployment on December
27, 2007. In addition, Atteberry alleged that Torsello sent him an e-mail
stating he was "okay with it." Atteberry alleged that Avantair inquired
into his military obligations after he received the job offer. On December
20, 2007, Avantair retracted the job offer and informed Atteberry that
there were no job openings, that company policy prohibited hiring former
employees, and that he had a poor exit interview in 2006. The United
States Department of Labor investigated Avantair's employment decision

51. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fla. State
Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1159 (11th Cir. 2008)).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision but did not
address the validity of a harassment claim under USERRA. See Dees, 2010 WL 675714.
55. No. 8:08-cv-01034-T-17EAJ, 2009 WL 1615519 (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2009).
56. Id. at*1.
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and determined that the explanations it provided for not hiring
Atteberry were false and pretextual 7
Atteberry filed his lawsuit in the Middle District of Florida on May 28,
2008, alleging that Avantair's actions violated USERRA. Avantair filed
a motion for summary judgment asserting that it had legitimate reasons
for refusing to rehire Atteberry and that there was no evidence its
decision was motivated by his military service." In reviewing Avantair's motion for summary judgment, the district court noted that the
Eleventh Circuit does not use the traditional McDonnell Douglasburdenshifting standard for deciding USERRA discrimination claims; instead,
the Eleventh Circuit uses a "but for" test6 9
Under the "but for" test, the plaintiff has the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case, which involves showing by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her military status was a motivating or
substantial factor in the defendant's decision.6" If the plaintiff meets
this burden, the defendant can avoid liability by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a legitimate reason for which it
would have taken the same action despite the plaintiff's military
involvement.6 Essentially, the district court explained, the defendant
of a USERRA claim discharges its burden of proof by showing that but
for its articulated legitimate reasons, the plaintiff would have suffered
no adverse action.62
The court found that Atteberry provided strong circumstantial
evidence that could convince a jury that Avantair did not rehire him
because of his military involvement. 3 Specifically, in October or
November 2007, Atteberry received information on possible job openings
at Avantair. After conversations with Atteberry, Avantair expressed
that it was interested in rehiring him and even agreed on December 27,
2007, as a start date. In addition, there was e-mail correspondence

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *2 (citing Coffman v. Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1238 (11th
Cir. 2005)).
60. Id. at *3; see also Coffman, 411 F.3d at 1238.
61. Atteberry, 2009 WL 1615519, at *3.
62. Id. The Eleventh Circuit in Coffman expressed the test differently:
When the employee has met this burden [of showing by a preponderance of the
evidence that his protected status was a motivating factor in the decision], the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the affirmative defense that legitimate
reasons, standing alone, would have induced the employer to take the same
adverse action.
411 F.3d at 1238-39 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sheehan v. Dep't of Navy,
240 F.3d 1009, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
63. Atteberry, 2009 WL 1615519, at *3.
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showing that an Avantair representative approved rehiring Atteberry.
While there normally would have been a delay in Atteberry's hiring
process because of the need to conduct a background check, Avantair
admitted that Atteberry's military involvement made this a non-issue.
Moreover, a representative of Avantair testified that because of the
holiday season, there was an immediate need for flight dispatchers-the
position for which Atteberry received a job offer.
Furthermore,
Avantair's management stated that Atteberry was a good candidate for
hire because he had knowledge of and experience with its systems and
processes, and he knew its aircraft and pilots.'
Additionally, the court found the timing of Avantair's retraction
suspicious, which was enough by itself to suggest that Atteberry's
military obligations were at least a motivating factor that affected
Avantair's hiring decision.65 Specifically, after it already had discussed
Atteberry's likelihood for rehire, Avantair inquired into Atteberry's
military obligations, including asking how much longer his military
obligations would last and what his obligations were. Avantair did not
inform Atteberry of its retraction until after Atteberry informed its
management that he had two more years of service and that his military
obligations would cause him to miss work.66 The court found that this
evidence, in addition to testimony from Avantair's management that the
position for which Atteberry was hired remained unfilled for a period of
time and was filled by a person less qualified than Atteberry, established
a prima facie case of discrimination.67
The court examined Avantair's articulated reasons for retracting the
job offer and determined that Avantair failed to establish legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. 8 To meet its burden on
summary judgment, the court explained, Avantair was required to
provide evidence that showed "but for legitimate reasons, standing alone,
[Atteberry] would have gained reemployment."69 Instead, the court
found that Avantair provided conflicting reasons for its actions, and
these reasons were inconsistent with testimony from Avantair's
representatives.70
Specifically, the court determined that Avantair's statement that it did
not rehire Atteberry because there were no available positions was

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id. at *4-5.
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refuted by its testimony that there was an urgent need to fill employment positions." Moreover, Avantair's stated reason that it could not
rehire Atteberry due to company policy that prohibited rehiring former
employees was refuted by testimony from Avantair that no such policy
existed.72 Similarly, Avantair's articulated reason that it did not rehire
Atteberry because of his poor exit interview was not supported by the
evidence because Avantair management testified that it did not review
Atteberry's exit interview until after it had retracted its job offer.7"
Based on the inconsistent testimony, the court ruled that Avantair failed
to meet its burden of showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its employment decision, and its articulated reasons were a pretext for
discrimination." Accordingly, the court denied Avantair's motion for
summary judgment. 5
This case illustrates the importance of thoroughly reviewing adverse
employment actions before they are carried out to verify that the
employer's reasons are supported by the facts. This is especially
important when the adverse employment actions affect employees in
protected categories. While the fact that an employee is in a protected
category does not mean that the employer cannot take any adverse
action against the employee, it does mean that the employer should take
a closer look at such adverse actions to ensure that it has reviewed the
potential risks and has taken measures to minimize these risks.
II.

EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT

In Zipp v. World Mortgage Co.,76 the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida addressed the viability of a failure to pay
overtime claim under ERISA." The court determined that although a
failure to pay overtime claim may have an impact on an ERISA plan, it
does not necessarily create an ERISA claim."
The plaintiffs, former and current employees of the defendants, filed
a complaint in the district court against five entities-World Mortgage
Company; World Savings Bank, F.S.B.; Golden West Financial Corporation; Wachovia Mortgage Corporation; and Wachovia Corporation. One
of the plaintiffs, William J. Walker Jr., alleged that he was a participant

71. Id. at *4.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *5.
75. Id.
76. 632 F. Supp. 2d 1117 (M.D. Fla. 2009).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006); Zipp, 632 F. Supp. at 1119.
78. Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
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in the defendants' pension and savings plans during his employment as
an appraiser with World Mortgage or World Savings from June 2003
through January 2006. Walker claimed that he was improperly
classified as an exempt employee under the FLSA v9 and therefore, he
did not receive overtime pay when he worked more than forty hours in
a workweek."0
In Count I of the complaint, Walker alleged that the defendants failed
to pay the plaintiffs overtime pay as required by the FLSA when they
worked more than forty hours in a workweek. In Count II, he asserted
that the defendants violated ERISA by failing to maintain records that
would provide sufficient information when calculating the participants'
benefit accrual rights under the pension plan. In addition, in Count III
of the complaint, Walker alleged that the defendants breached their
fiduciary duties by failing to credit the plaintiffs for overtime pay when
calculating their benefits under the savings and pension plans. Walker
sought injunctive relief requiring the defendants to credit all members
of the purported class with compensation under the pension plan for past
and future overtime they worked, among other things.8"
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, in which they
noted that Walker's employer was Golden West and that Golden West
did not maintain a "Pension and Savings Plan" but instead maintained
a World Increased Savings for Employees plan (WISE plan). The
defendants assumed that the WISE plan was the plan at issue, to which
the court agreed because there was no objection from the plaintiff.
Under the WISE plan, employees could elect to defer two percent to
twenty percent of their compensation and have this amount credited to
their WISE plan account.8 2 The WISE plan defined compensation as
"wages, salaries, fees for professional service and other amounts paid by
an Employer to an Employee. . . for personal services actually rendered
by the Employee."3
The defendants argued that Walker sought an ERISA remedy for
alleged FLSA violations and that the ERISA claims were duplicative of
or dependent on FLSA claims. Specifically, the defendants asserted that
Walker could not use ERISA's catchall provision to enforce the alleged
recordkeeping violations in Count II of the complaint. Moreover, the
defendants argued, ERISA does not require that plan fiduciaries monitor
whether an employer is compliant with the FLSA's overtime provisions

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1118-19.
Id.
Id. at 1119 & n.2.
Id. at 1119 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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or recordkeeping requirements. In addition, the defendants argued that
Walker incorrectly was using a claim for equitable relief to seek legal
relief. Lastly, the defendants argued that Walker's ERISA claims were
barred because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.8 4
The district court acknowledged that FLSA overtime and recordkeeping violation claims couched as ERISA "catchall" claims had survived
motions to dismiss in other courts.' However, the defendants cited a
number of decisions in which courts held that (1) ERISA did not provide
a private cause of action for recordkeeping violations due to misclassifying an employee as exempt, and (2) such a claim was for benefits-that
is, damages- and not a claim for equitable relief. 6
After reviewing the caselaw provided by both parties, the court
concluded that the decisions presented by the defendants provided a
better-reasoned approach. 7 Specifically, the court cited favorably a
decision from the United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota in which the court determined that an inquiry into the
validity of FLSA overtime claims couched as ERISA claims should first
examine whether such a claim was cognizable under ERISA.5 In that
case, the court determined that ERISA did not govern a defendant's
business decision on how to classify its employees as exempt or
nonexempt under the FLSA."9 In addition, the Minnesota court found
that "[an employer's discretion in determining salaries is a business
judgment which does not involve the administration of an ERISA plan
or the investment of an ERISA plan's assets. Such a decision may
ultimately affect a plan indirectly but it does not implicate fiduciary
concerns regarding plan administration or assets." °

84. Id. at 1120.
85. Id.; see also Rosenburg v. Intl Bus. Machs. Corp., No. C 06-0430 PJH, 2006 WL
1627108, at *9 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2006) (holding that the plaintiffs ERISA claims were
not unripe simply because they were dependent on the plaintiffs FLSA claims); In re
Farmers Ins. Exch. Claims Representatives' Overtime Pay Litig., MDL No. 33-1439(B),
2005 WL 1972565, at *3-4 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2005) (holding that the plaintiffs were not
precluded from filing an ERISA claim under the catchall provision to enjoin the defendant's
alleged recordkeeping violations).
86. Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1121-24; see Premick v. Dick's Sporting Goods, Inc., No.
02:06cv0530, 2007 WL 141913, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 18, 2007); see also Maranda v. Group
Health Plan, Inc., Civ. No. 07-4655 DSD/SRN, 2008 WL 2139584 (D. Minn. May 20, 2008).
87. Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
88. Id. (citing LePage v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., Civ. No. 08-584, 2008 WL
2570815, at *5 (D. Minn. June 25, 2008)).
89. LePage, 2008 WL 2570815, at *5.
90. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F. Supp.
2d 1012, 1023 (E.D. Mo. 2002)).
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The district court in Zipp agreed with the district court in Minnesota
that the plaintiff's FLSA claims presented as ERISA claims were not
legally cognizable.9 1 The court believed that a company's business
decision to classify employees as exempt or nonexempt under the FLSA
for overtime purposes may impact an ERISA plan, but this "does not
render the claims based on that classification decision ERISA claims."9 2
Consequently, the court found that the plaintiff's recordkeeping claim
related to an employment decision that may have affected an ERISA
plan, but this was not enough to state an ERISA claim. 93 The plaintiff
did not allege that the defendants failed to keep records as required by
ERISA, but instead that they kept incorrect records based on their
misclassification of employees as exempt under the FLSA.94 The court
also found that the defendants acted in accordance with the plan when
they followed the WISE plan's definition of compensation and credited
the plan based on the amount the employees were paid and not the
amount they allegedly earned. 95 Accordingly, the court dismissed with
prejudice Counts II and III of the plaintiff's complaint because they did
not properly assert ERISA claims.96
The decision in Zipp provides a good example of a court's reluctance
to expand ERISA claims. ERISA provides employees with certain rights
with respect to welfare benefit plans, but legal claims that can be
brought under ERISA are quite narrow. Courts seek to ensure that such
claims are actually tied to an ERISA plan and do not simply impact an
ERISA plan. Obviously this does not mean that the decision in Zipp
provides a defense to a FLSA exemption claim. The decision in Zipp is
narrowly framed and only applies to a plaintiff's attempt to assert a
FLSA exemption claim as an ERISA claim.
III.

THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

In Gregory v. First Title of America, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit
determined that a marketing executive who obtained orders for title
insurance services was an exempt employee under the FLSA s8 outside
sales exemption.99 The plaintiff, Nelda L. Gregory, worked as a
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92.
93.
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95.
96.
97.
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Zipp, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
Id.
Id. at 1124-25.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Id.
555 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2009).
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2006).
Gregory, 555 F.3d at 1301.
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marketing executive for the defendants, First Title of America, Inc. and
Bruce Napolitano, from July 2004 through January 2005. Napolitano
owned First Title."°° Gregory entered into an employment agreement
with First Title, which provided that she would be paid $1000 per week
and that her position was to "provide the services for referring and
closing title insurance companies."" 1 Gregory later suggested that she
be paid on a commission basis at which point she received fifty percent
commission for all title insurance orders from her clients that closed
with First Title. Gregory alleged that she was a nonexempt employee
and was entitled to overtime pay when she worked more than forty
hours in a workweek, but she was never paid any overtime. 0 2
First Title responded that it did not pay Gregory overtime because it
considered her exempt from overtime under the FLSA based on the
outside sales exemption. Specifically, First Title asserted that Gregory
was exempt because her main responsibility was to bring in or obtain
orders for First Title, and her compensation was tied directly to orders
for title services that actually closed."°3 Gregory claimed that this
exemption was not applicable to her because she did not sell title
insurance or title insurance services directly, nor was she licensed to do
so. Instead, she asserted that her duties only involved inducing realtors,
brokers, and lenders to refer their customers to First Title for title
insurance services. Gregory claimed that her work merely was
promotional and not selling." 4
The Middle District of Florida granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment after finding that Gregory met the requirements of
the FLSA's outside sales exemption. Gregory appealed this decision to
the Eleventh Circuit.105
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the regulations implemented
by the Department of Labor.106 An individual is considered an exempt
employee under the FLSA's outside sales exemption if (1) his or her
primary duty is "(i) making sales ... or (ii) obtaining orders or contracts
for services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will be
paid by the client or customer"; and (2) the individual "is customarily
and regularly engaged away from the employer's place or places of

100. Id.
101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
102.
103.
104.
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See id.
Id. at 1305.
Id. at 1303-04.
Id. at 1301.
See id. at 1302-03.
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business in performing such primary duty." °7 A "primary duty" is the
"principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee
performs."108 Factors that should be considered in determining a
primary duty include:
the relative importance of the exempt duties as compared with other
types of duties; the amount of time spent performing exempt work; the
employee's relative freedom from direct supervision; and the relationship between the employee's salary and the wages paid to other
employees
for the kind of nonexempt work performed by the employ19

ee.

0

As the Eleventh Circuit observed, the FLSA regulations provide that
"'[piromotional work that is actually performed incidental to and in
conjunction with an employee's own outside sales or solicitations is
exempt work' whereas 'promotional work that is incidental to sales
made, or to be made, by someone else is not exempt outside sales
work.'" 10 In addition, the regulations provide that
[e]xempt outside sales work includes not only the sales of commodities,
but also "obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of
facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer." Obtaining orders for "the use of facilities" includes the selling of
time on radio or television, the solicitation of advertising for newspapers and other periodicals, and the solicitation of freight for railroads
and other transportation agencies."'
The court determined that Gregory was an exempt employee because
her primary duty was obtaining orders-that is, bringing in orders-for
The court concluded that
First Title's title insurance service.'12
Gregory was obtaining orders for services because Gregory testified that
the goal of her promotional work for First Title was to obtain orders for
title services. "' Moreover, the court concluded that Gregory did make
sales "in some sense" because she obtained a commitment for the
purchase of First Title's title insurance service, and First Title credited
her with this "sale.""' Indeed, Gregory's income was tied directly to
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Id. at 1302 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 541.500(a)
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Id.
Id. at 1308-09.

1192

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

the number of orders she brought into First Title, which was based on
orders placed by her clients that closed." 5 The court concluded that
Gregory's efforts were tied directly toward the consummation of her own
sales and only generally to stimulating sales for First Title."' Gregory
was not paving the way for another person to consummate the sale; she
received direct credit for any orders that were made by her clients." 7
Based on all these facts, the court determined that the district court
correctly found that Gregory was an exempt employee under the FLSA's
outside sales exemption and affirmed its grant of summary judgment to
the defendants."' s
This decision highlights the importance of properly analyzing
employees' duties in accordance with applicable regulations in classifying
their positions as exempt or nonexempt. This case is especially
consistent because it helps employers establish that "making sales" and
"obtaining orders" can be interpreted broadly to include duties that
otherwise might be considered "promotional" and nonexempt. Any
organization that employs individuals to visit with customers and
discuss the purchase of goods or services should consider the Gregory
decision and its possible value in support of the outside sales exemption.
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